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Abstract
A recent important article published in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics relates finance theory to the microeconomic theory of the
firm. This study undertakes the same task.
A vital question concerning the electric utility industry is how
does each firm adjust its capital structure or operating strategy so as
to minimize the possible adverse impace of Commission regulation upon
its performance. By using both one way and two way analysis of
variance, this paper demonstrates that different degrees of regulation
does affect operating and financial strategies.
The above results indicate that different regulatory processes
induce different operating strategies to permit a firm to neutralize the
effects of the regulatory constraint. However, the evidence concerning
a firm's adjustment of financial policy to avoid possible burdens of
regulation is not as conclusive as in the case of operating strategy.

IMPACTS OF RATE-BASE METHODS
ON FIRM OPERATING ELASTICITY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The effect of utility regulation on the financial behavior of
firms is an important matter, but one important avenue of inquiry has
remained relatively unexplored. That is, regulation is not a homo-
geneous commodity and all regulated firms are not subjected to the
same degree of regulation. This condition raises an important ques-
tion; if the quality of regulation differs among the regulatory
regimes faced by the individual firms operating in different states,
how does each firm adjust its capital structure and operating strategy
so as to minimize the possible adverse impact of that regulation on
its performance. That inquiry is the main purpose of this study; that
is, do differences in regulatory regimes faced by regulated firms af-
fect their capital structure and operating elasticity?
The research results lead to policy implications and, in addition,
this paper attempts to serve as a bridge to link together financial
management perspectives VTith the regulatory process. Furthermore, it
demonstrates that the pooling time-series and cross-sectional Analysis
of Variance (ANOVA) , instead of cross-sectional ANOVA, can be used to
detect the dynamic inpact of the regulatory process or utility firms'
operating and financial policies. Overall, this study, as did an
earlier important study by Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980), attempts
to relate finance theory to the microeconomic theory* of the firm.
The plan is as ^ allows . The second section re\T.ews previous
studies; the third S':ction develops the theoretical base for this
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paper; the fourth presents empirical studies developed to test the
relevant hypotheses; finally, a summary is presented and concluding
remarks are provided
.
II. PRR^IOUS STUDIES
The landmark study by Modigliani and Miller (K & M) (1958) examined
electric utility firms and discussed risk class of securities caused by
the variability of earnings streams. Modigliani and Miller's (1955,
1963, 1965 and 1966) studies are all concerned with other matters and
they are not explicitly concerned with the effect of different types of
regulatory regimes on the degree of homogeneity with a risk class.
Boness and Frankfurter (1977) are somevjhat critical of K & M and
question whether risk class should be associated with industry. They
examine what they term "the believed- to-be most homogeneous of industries,
electric utilities." They conclude that the results of their tests are
convincingly at variance with the notion that the electric utility industry
is a homogeneous population. They conclude:
Simply the M & M choice, as that of many others' using the
definition of electric utilities (or any other "industry"
for that matter) as a surrogate for risk class, was a poor
choice.
Kite (1977) theoretically investigated the relationship among
leverage, output effects, and the M & M theorems. He argued that output,
investment and financing decisions must be optimized simultaneously.
VJhile the Hite study is interesting, it too does not explicitly address
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the questions of how operating decisions and operating strategy are
affected by utility regulation.
In another study, Eiteman (1962) examined the permitted and
earned rates of return of fifteen Bell Telephone companies in the
1950-59 period. Eiteman found that "...actual rates of return to
book value of securities (that is, to original cost) ...have been
highest for companies in the reproduction-cost jurisdictions and
lowest for the companies in the original-cost jurisdictions."
Pike (1967), using electric utility data for 1961-63 found a mean
rate of return of 6.38 percent on net plant in original cost jurisdic-
tions and 6.63 percent where other valuation methods were used.
Petersen (1976) found that the allowed rates of return and the
realized earnings were both higher for fair value firms than those
in original cost jurisdictions; he found a higher allowed rate of return
which is not consistent with some other work, including Kagerman and
Ratchford (1978) and Primeaux (1978).
Some of the previous studies recognize that different types of
regulation may cause differences in the level of earnings streams; yet,
this possibility vjas ignored by the M & M and Boness and Frankfurter
studies. Actually, Boness and Frankfurter did not address the ques-
tion of leverage and differences in leverage in a risk class. They
simply examined the M & M assumption that their sample of electric
utilities represented a homogeneous risk class in measuring capital
costs. Moreover, most of the latter studies do recognize the effect
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of different degrees of regulation on the level of the earnings stream,
but they do not explicitly examine the differential impact of regulatory
regimes. Adjustments of capital structure and operating strategy could
occur as firms attenqit to neutralize the effect of utility regulation
on their business and financial risk. Moreover, these different
regulatory effects may also affect the degree of homogeneity within a
sample of electric utility firms.
III. THE THEORY
The rate base is defined as the gross valuation of public utility
property, less depreciation. In electric utility rate making, the rate
base is considered as an important variable because it is at the core cf
the rate determination process. The state regulator}' commission must
also establish a rate of return allowable on the rate base; then that
rate is applied to the rate base to determine the return amount which
the utility may earn. Then, the specific rate schedules for the utility
must be constructed. This indicates, therefore, that both the rate base
and the rate of return affect the earnings which the utility generates
from selling its services. The rate base is detenrdned on the basis of
original cost, fair value, or reproduction cost depending upon the state
in which the firm is situated. State law prescribes which method is to
be used in a given state,
A distinct difference exists between original cost, fair value,
and reproduction cost methods of determining the rate base, Garfield
and Love joy (1964, p. 60) explain thct in the original cost method the
property is valued at its cost v+ien it was first used in a public utility
-5-
application. The procedure is historical, in a sense, because the cur-
rent n-iarket valuation of the equipment is irrelevant to its value for
rate making.
Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p. 59) explain that in fair value
valuation of a rate base the value is determined by considering three
factors: "(a) The actual cost of the property; (b) the present value
of construction.,.; and (c) other matters generally taken to represent
various intangibles." This technique clearly provides for a considera-
tion of the current cost of equipment in determining the value of a rate
base for rate making purposes.
The reproduction cost less depreciation rate base method of valua-
tion involves "...the cost of duplicating the existing plant at recent
or present prices, less depreciation." Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p.
63). This procedure involves a consideration of construction costs and
price level adjustments. This approach, therefore, considers changes
in the value of money caused by inflation or deflation.
There are arguments advanced for and against the use of each of
these three methods of rate base valuation; see Garfield and Lovejoy
(1964, p. 58-65). The facts remain, however, that one of these methods
is used in each state regulatory jurisdiction. It is obvious (from
footnote 1) that each of these three methods of rate base determination
will permit the firm to generate a different earnings stream or revenue
requirement. Realized rates of return could be highest for reproduction
cost jurisdictions and lowest for firms in original cost jurisdictions.
Firms in fair value jurisdictions could generate rates of return in
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between original cost and reproduction costs unless the different
allowed rates of return is used to compensate the low rate base."
As mentioned above, the relative profitability among firms operating
in different regulator}' regimes has been intensively tested by different
scholars. However, previous studies have not investigated the possible
differences of operating elasticity among firms facing different types of
regulation. The operating elasticity is generally defined as the percent-
age change of profit with respect to percentage charge of sales. This is
an index indicating the tendency for the profitability of a firm to in-
crease as sales increase with a particular level of production capacity.
In financial analysis the degree of operating leverage (DOL) is generally
used to measure the operating elasticity. This measure has recently become
more popular in the empirical research, e.g., Mandelker and Rhee (1981)
have recently investigated the relationship between beta estimate and
the DOL, and found that they are generally positively related for both
utility and non-utility industries. The DOL concept will be empiri-
cally analyzed for the firms in the sample facing different regulatory
regimes. The assumptions used to derive the DOL are that both cost
function and revenue function are linear. The justification cf this
issue for the electric utility industry will be explored in the fol-
lowing section.
Total risks faced by a firm are generally divided into business
risks and financial risks. The market movements and values of common
stock reflect investors' perceptions of both the potential return as
well as the risks involved in financial investments. If one examines
the motivation of stock investors, he finds that investors in utility
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equity investments generally place more emphasis in the stability of
the income stream; in addition, these investors may have preference
3
for dividend return rather than capital gain. As the dividend pay-
ment for a firm is a function of the earning stream, as pointed out
by Lintner (1956), a firm with a relatively certain income stream
will have a relative stable dividend policy. Therefore, financial
managers in the electric utility industry may generally' adjust their
financial strategies according to the regulatory regime they face to
assure that both stable earning streams and dividend payments over
time can be maintained.
Since the consumer's demand curve for electricity is not perfectly
inelastic, there is a consumption response to price changes or price
differences. Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980) have shown that
demand elasticity is one of the important microeconomic \'ariables
affecting risks. When prices of a commodity are raised, the consumer
reduces his consumption because of the substitution effect and the
income effect. The income effect means that the higher (lower) price
reduces (increases) the real income of the buyer. Moreover, the sub-
stitution effect means that the higher (lower) price decreases (in-
creases) the relative attractiveness of a commodity and makes the
consumer willing to buy less (more) of it. One might expect more
volatility in the income stream of an electricity firm under fair
value, and reproduction cost jurisdictions than in original cost
jurisdictions, mainly because of the nature of the regulatory process.
The logic of this statement follows.
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If one examines the rate base methods mentioned above, one finds
that the original cost method is less cluttered with estimates and sub-
jective judgment in its implementation of the regulator^' procedure; the
fair value method is next in its degree of subjective judgment and the
reproduction cost method involves more estimates and subjective judgment
than the other two. It is a combination of this subjective judgment and
the probability of inconsistent estimates which yields the highest busi-
ness risks for reproduction costs jurisdictions, the next highest for
fair value, and the lowest for original cost jurisdictions. The more
subjective estimation methods will yield less consistent prices and more
consumer changes in consumption as was mentioned above. These adjust-
ments also affect rates of return earned by the firms and, all other
things equal, cause differences in business risk. Of course, parts of
the volatility can also be caused by the change of allowed rates of
return among different regulation regimes. Firms facing more volatile
earnings streams may generally use less financial leverage to make their
total risks equal to that of firms with lower business risks. This
argument is based upon the assumption that an electric utility firm
would like to have a net earning stream available to common stock
holder at least as stable as the other firms within the same industry.
Consequently, one would expect to find a lesser use of leverage in
reproduction cost regimes, the highest usage of financial leverage in
original cost regimes, and the fair value regimes would be in between
these two extremes. In sum, the managers of electric utility companies
facing different regulator^' regimes may adjust capital structures to
make the total risk of their companies comparable to other electric
-9-
companies competing for the same type of investors. It should be
noted that whether the financial managers associated vith different
regulatory regimes have, in fact, adjusted their company's capital
structure is an empirical issue. Hence, the possible differences of
both the DOL and the capital structure among different regulatory
regimes will be empirically tested in the following section.
IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION^
Data from fifty-nine electric utility firms during 1958-75 are
used to investigate the effects of different types of regulation on the
operating and financial strategy of firms in the electric utility indus-
try. Appendix A shows that the sample consisted of 34 firms regulated
by original cost rates base jurisdictions, 19 firms regulated by a fair
value rate base jurisdiction, and 6 firms from reproduction cost rate
base jurisdictions.
A data summary is presented in Appendix B. The sample was selected
from the electric utility firms listed in the Compustat utility tape.
Firms operating in more than one state V7ere eliminated because they were
regulated by different regulatory^ bodies. This procedure avoided the
joint effect on a single firm caused by different rate base methods
being used in different states. Holding companies were also excluded.
Some electric firms also sell natural gas; therefore, within the sample
for each rate base method, roughly the same proportion of firms sold
both gas and electricity as those selling only electricity. This approach
was used to reduce the market power problem which is created V7hen firms
face no competition from substitute fuel when they sell both gas and
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electricity in a single market. The market power effects on firm risk
determination has been theoretically analyzed by Subrahmanyam and
Thomadakis (1980). To reveal the dynamic nature of the impact of different
regulatory regimes, data for 18 years, 1958-75 were used in the analysis.
The possible impact of different regulation on the operating
elasticity of the electric utility firms was evaluated by examining
the degree of operating leverage. Following Hunt (1961), Mao (1969),
and Weston and Brigham (1981) the degree of operating leverage (DCL)
can be defined as:
"'''^ QCP-V)-FC (1)
where: P = market price per unit of product
V = variable cost per unit of product
Q = total quantity of goods sold
FC = total fixed operating cost
Based upon the break-even formula, DOL can be re^nritten as:
DOL = ^ (2)
' Q
FC
where Q* = -r—rr is the break-even point. Equation (2) indicates that
the DOL is determined by the magnitude of both Q* and 0. If firm A's
DOL is higher than the DOL of firm B, this implies that the percentage
of profit increase from a one percent increase of net sales for firm A
will be higher than that of firm B.
This approach to DOL, of course, assumes linearity in the total
revenue and total cost functions. The discussion belovj shows that this
is not an unreasonable assumption. UT^en examining the cost curve fcr
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electrical generation, J. Johnston (1960) reported that marginal and
average variable cost are constant over the relevant range of output
in the short run. Isliile he was less confident in his long-run
estitnates, because of severe defects in available data on capital
costs, he reported that long-run average costs fall quickly and steeply
and then approximates a horizontal straight line. Moreover, a recent
study of electric power generation found that a large portion of all
electric power was produced in the flat region of the average cost
curve, supporting linear cost functions over a wide range of output
(Christensen and Green, 1976, p. 673). Both of these results offer
strong empirical support for linear cost curves. Note that both
break-even and DOL types of analyses are short-run instead of long-
run in nature [See Adar, Bamea, and Lev (1977)]. The conclusions
from the empirical work by Johnston and Christensen and Green seem
to adequately support the proposition that a linear total variable
cost function is a very reasonable assumption in the electric utility
industry.
On the revenue side, there seems to be equally strong support for
a linear total revenue function. A set of published graphical presenta-
tions show that total revenue from electricity sales to residential,
commercial, and industrial customers seemed to approximate a linear
pattern between 1963 and 1973 (FPC, 1973, pp. LIII-LV) . Moreover,
the assumption of linear functions is frequently made because of
computational ease and interpretation of regression results, as well
as other reasons. Consequently, the assumption of a linear revenue
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function is not unrealistic in this case. See: Elliott (1973,
pp. 25-26).
Together, the above evidence seems to justify the assumption of a
linear total variable cost and total revenue relationship used in this
analysis of DOL.
To investigate the impact of different regulatory regimes on firm's
earnings elasticity, DOL's were calculated for fifty-nine firms during
1958-1975. Analysis of variance [ANOVA] statistical technique was used
to test whether the DOL's for firms operating in fair value, original
cost, and reproduction cost regulatory regimes were significantly dif-
fe rent
.
First the ANOVA is used to test whether the average DOL is different
among the three regulatory regimes, in each year. The null and alterna-
tive hypotheses can be defined as
(3)
^o = ^It
==
^2t = ^3t
H = not all average DOL's are equal
where p = the average DOL for original cost regime in t year.
Vi„ = the average DOL for fair value regime in t year.
p„ = the average DOL for the replacement cost regime t year.
During the sample period, there exists 3A , 19 and 6 firms for orig-
inal cost, fair value and reproduction cost regimes respectively [See
Appendix A]. Therefore, the number of observations is not equal for each
separate group included in the sample. However, Neter and Wasserman (197A,
Chapter 13) have shown that it is not necessary- to have an equal number of
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observations within each group to utilize one-way ANOVA technique. To
test the statistical hypotheses, as indicated in equation (3), we need
the information associated with sum of squares, degrees of freedom,
mean squares for both between group and within group to calculate the
F value. The ANOVA table for both 1958 and 1975 are presented in
Table la. The computed F value with the table value reveals that the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% level of confidence for both
1958 and 1975; however, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the
10% level of confidence for both 1958 and 1975. It should be noted
that the ANOVA results for other years can be interpreted in a similar
way as is indicated here; the complete results for the eighteen years
examined are presented in Table lb.
The F values listed in Table lb reveal that the DOL's are
significantly different among different regulation regimes at the 5%
or 10% level for ten of the 18 years examined. The average DOL (DOL)
figure listed in Table lb shows that the DOL's associated with fair
value valuation are always higher than those of original cost regimes.
The larger profit response to sales increases in fair value regimes
relative to original cost would tend to encourage utility firms to
promote greater consumer usage. This implies a tendency for firms
under fair value regulation to generate higher operating elasticity
than firms under original cost jurisdictions. This reflects a
differential response of the change of profit with respect to the
change of sales within each regulatory regime. The implications of
this finding are as follows.
-lA-
The DOL is determined by the change of both Q and C*; and Q* is
determined by FC, F and V. Both Q and FC are decision variables which
are generally affected by operating strategy of firms. Kence, the
conclusion is that a firm's operating strategy is not independent of
the regulatory regime it faces.
The next step examined DOL for pooled cross section and time
series data for firms in the sample. Chang and Lee (1977) used pooled
time-series and cross-section data to demonstrate the importance of
time effects in financial analysis. To incorporate the time effect
into the model, a two-way ANOVA is used to analyze the DOL for 59
firms during 1955-1975. The results are shown in Table Ic. Method-
ologically, the randomized Block Design is used to ascertain the
independence of the error components. The sample sizes associated
with the case being examined are unequal; however, the frequencies
are proportional and therefore, the method used to calculate the
variance component is identical to the equal sample size two-way AKOVA.
[See Keter and Wasserman (197A, Chapter 19)]. Table Ic shov-s that
the time factor and interaction factor are both significant at the
one percent level and the regulation regime factor is significant at
the ten percent level. This two vjay analysis for the DOL provides a
more overall picture of the dynamic impact of the regulation process
on the firm's operating decision. The previous analysis ignores the
time effects and the interaction effects between time and regulation;
therefore, the results are static and efficiency of the estimate of F
values is diminished. This also illustrates the importance of using
a correct specification for performing ANOVA analysis.
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Two different measures of leverage were used to examine the im-
pact of different degrees of regulation on electric utilitj' company's
financing strategy (or capital structure). Following Krainer (1977) and
Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) both the income statement and the
balance sheet measures of leverage were used to make this empirical test.
The first leverage measure is defined as total interest charges of
firm i (li) divided by total returns for firm i (Xi) [li/Xi] ; the second
leverage measure is defined as total book value of long-term debt for
firm i (Di) divided by total book value of asset (Ai) [tv] • The analysis
of variance technique was again used to determine the extent of dif-
ferences in leverage among firms operating in the three different
regulatory regimes.
Table 2 reveals that there were really no differences in leverage
among firms operating in the three different regimes for all 18 years
when the Di/Ai definition is used. However, if the li/Xi definition
is used (see Table 3), significant differences exist among firms in
the three different regimes for 7 of the IB years included in the
sample.
It is appropriate to consider the relative advantages of the two
different definitions of leverage, — and — . Killer and Modigliani
(1958) defined leverage as the ratio between market value of debt and
li
Ximarket value of equity. Miller and Modigliani (1963) argued that
—
can be used as an alternative leverage measure. It is clear that
the definition of rrr is much closer than tt to M & M's original theo-
Xi Ai
retical concept of leverage if the marginal corporate tax rate is not
zero. Krainer (1977) discussed the advantage of using r^r as the leverage
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measure. He considers Xi a more natural measure for bond holders since
a going concern's operating income, X., is the ultimate source for
fulfilling the bond contract. In addition, Krainer argued that over
time changes in the interest rate might itself be concealed in the
debt-equity ratio.
Table 2 also shows that the D/A's for the electric utility firm are
around forty- five percent. This figure is nearly identical to the Bell
9 —
System's optimal capital structure. The D/A with current debt in-
cluded as part of total debt is presented in parentheses in Table 2.
The results show that current debt of electric utility firms is
approximately 2-3 percent.
Table 3 shows that firms facing original cost regimes except in
1974 and 19 75, have the highest ^-r; and the ^r's of firms regulated
Xl AX
by fair value regimes is higher than those of firms confronting
reproduction cost regimes for 12 of 18 years. If interest charges
are similar for all three regimes, then the different — may well
be because regulation by reproduction cost regimes is more liberal than
that of either original cost or fair value regimes; and the regulation
for fair value is more liberal than that of original cost regimes, as
found by Petersen (1976).
The different leverage ratio measures seem to yield different
results, as indicated in Tables 2 and 3, so several additional points
should be mentioned. First, if two firms have different rates of
return, then the income statement leverage ratio measure (yr) instead
Di
of the balance sheet type of leverage ratio measure (—) should be
used to measure the degree of financial risk. This argument is based
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upon the fact that ttt- is a better proxy relative to -r for measuring
the potential of a firm to fulfill its obligation to creditors over
time. Secondly, our empirical work shows relatively low leverage
ratios in terms of — associated vjith fair value regimes relative to
original cost regimes. This indicates that firms under fair value
jurisdictions have lowered their financial risk to make their total
risk compatible with the total risk associated with firms under original
cost jurisdictions. Finally, this analysis also implies that the
empirical results obtained by Gale (1972), Hurdle (1974) and others
using -T-T- instead of ttt, as a proxy for financial risk, may require
some reexamination. Incidentally, data show that most of the long
term debt of the utility industry is mortgage debt. The implication
of mortgage debt (secured debt) on the value of a firm can be found
in a recent analysis by Scott (1977).
A two-way ANOVA model was used to test the time effect, the group
effect, and the interaction effects in both -r-r and — . The same sample,
AX AX
time periods, and design method as used in the two-way ANOVA for DOL
analysis was used in these tests. The results are presented in Tables 4
and 5.
In the rr-r analysis. Table 4 indicates that both time effects
Xx
and interaction effects are statistically significant at the one percent
level. However, the regulation regime effect alone is not statistically
significant. For the
-^ analysis. Table 5 shows that only the time effect
is statistically significant at the one percent level.
The results presented in Table 4 and 5 reveal that both the income
statement and the balance sheet measures of leverage change over time.
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However, the balance sheet type of leverage measure is net different for
firms regulated by different regulatory regimes. Moreover, the income
statement type of measure is different for firms operating in different
regulatory regimes. It should be noted, however, that the difference is
caused by the interaction of time and the different regulatory regimes.
As mentioned in the earlier discussion of DOL, this dynamic approach is
superior to the static analysis presented in Tables 2 and 3.
The analyses of this section reveal that the different degrees cf
regulation, as reflected by the different regulatory regimes, do change
the DOL and cause some adjustments to the financial strategy of electric
utility firms. This conclusion may have some implications for Boness
and Frankfurter's findings about the heteroscedastic nature of utility
firms within the utility industry. Boness and Frankfurter (19 77) dis-
cussed fifty-one of the fifty-four firms included in the Killer and
Modigliani (1966) study.
Of the fifty-one firms used by Boness and Frankfurter, ve were able
to classify without ambiguity forty-three according to the rate base
method used in states in which they operate. We eliminated Texas firms,
which were regulated at the local level, and firms operating in states
where rate base methods could not be identified with a high level of
accuracy. Our classification shows that the M & M sample firms face
at least three different regulatory regimes. Some firms in M & M's and
in our sample produced both electricity and natural gas. From the market
power theory developed by Hurdle (197A), it can be argued that firms
producing both electricity and natural gas will have market power to
generate more profit than those firms selling only one of these products.
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This may be an additional reason for Boness and Frankfurter's findings;
market power differences generally make firms dissimilar, even if they
are in the same industry.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
By using both one way and two way analysis of variance, this paper
has shown that different degrees of regulation in some degree does
affect operating and financing strategies of electric utility firms.
The degree of operating leverage concept is used as a measure of
operating elasticity; both balance sheet and income statement leverage
ratios were also used as indices of financing strategy. It was foimd
that different degrees of utility regulation do affect a firm's operating
leverage; different regulation also causes a firm to adjust its financial
leverage in terms of li/Xi to neutralize business risk, to some extent.
In addition, strong time effects associated with both operation elasticity
and capital structure were also observed.
The above results indicate that different regulatory processes
induce different operating strategies to permit a firm to neutralize
the effects of the regulatory constraint. However, the evidence
concerning a firm's adjustment of financial policy to avoid possible
burdens of regulation is not as conclusive as in the case of operating
strategy. This result may be caused by more emphasis in the regulatory
process on pricing instead of financial structure; although, regulators
do consider capital structure to a lesser extent. If more emphasis
was directed to control of capital structure, the results might be
different.
-20-
This work has brought together important microecononic concents
as discussed by Hite (1977), Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980),
and Greenberg, et. al.
,
(1978) and previous financial research.
The analysis demonstrates the relevance of icicroeconomics to the
theory of finance and provides some insights into firm behavior
under a regulatory constraint.
-21-
Table 1-a
Analysis of Variance - DOL Arranged by Rate Base Method
(1958 and 1975)
1958
Component
Degree of
Freedom
Sum of
Squares
Mean
Square
Between-group
means 2
Wi thin-group
means 56
Total 58
,517155
5.138740
5.655895
.258578 2.8179-
.091763
1975
Degree of Sum of Mean
Component Freedom Squares Squares F
Between-group
means 2 .598972 .299436 2.6945*
Wi thin-group
means 56 6.223110 .111127
Total 58 6.822082
*significant at 10% level
-22-
Table 1-b
Average DOL and the F values
DOL F statistics
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 2.3325 2.2463 2.4472 2.3867 2.8179*
1959 2.2922 2.2213 2.3988 2.3574 2.7447*
1960 2.2804 2.2020 2.3856 2.3910 2.9418*
1961 2.2867 2.2001 2.3996 2.4169 3.1125**
1962 2.2665 2.1998 2.3627 2.3389 1.6630
1963 2.2517 2.1683 2.3848 2.3027 2.7558*
1964 2.2274 2.1385 2.3682 2.2852 3.343b**
1965 2.1757 2.0935 2.2982 2.2538 3.2999**
1966 2.1299 2.0569 2.2185 2.2633 2.8257*
1967 2.0967 2.0343 2.1682 2.2241 2.0121
1968 2.1063 2.0414 2.1796 2.2426 2.2828
1969 2.0569 1.9945 2.1414 2.1427 2.1565
1970 1.9864 1.9458 2.0635 1.9729 1.3475
1971 1.9776 1.9515 2.0414 1.9237 .8723
1972 1.9643 1.9294 2.0608 1.8567 2.2110
1973 1.9717 1.9493 2.0685 1.7920 2.4049*
1974 1.9512 1.9239 2.0613 1.7570 1.9150
1975 1.9716 1.9499 2.0851 1.7343 2.6945*
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table 2
Average value of -—- and the F Statistics^ Ai
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Di
Ai
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
45.60 (47.29)* 45.72 45.98 43.71
45.09 (47.06) 45.01 45.76 43.42
44.89 (46.43) 45.01 44.90 44. 19
45.22 (47.04) 45.43 45.61 42.83
44.33 (45.65) 44.32 44.56 43.69
43.71 (45.50) 43.34 44.45 43.42
43.30 (45.39) 43.19 43.73 42.53
42.97 (45.60) 43.21 43.07 41.28
43.41 (46.95) 43.47 44.40 39.97
43.86 (48.14) 43.30 45.25 42.67
44.74 (49.68) . 44.85 45.75 40.95
44.84 (50.70) 45.09 45.10 42.65
46.76 (51.29) 46.28 47.10 48.40
46.79 (51.09) 46.74 46.97 46.51
45.55 (50.33) 45.07 46.41 45.48
44.80 (49.81) 44.35 45.14 46.34
42.66 (46.53) 43.25 42.73 43.00
43.75 (48.19) 44.01 43.03 44.54
F statistics
.5255
.8313
.1004
1.0352
.0917
.2870
.1691
.4060
1.3751
.6495
1.3953
.4807
.7256
.0480
.6324
.6162
.3595
.5897
*For the
—r values in parentheses, the Di value includes current liabilities.
Al '^
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Table 3
Average Value of
-rrr and the F Statistics
Xi
(li/Xi) F statistics
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 17.34% 17.90% 16.53% 16.77% .5270
1959 17.03 17.59 16.42 15.77 .4317
1960 16.98 17.38 16.89 14.97 .5248
1961 17.29 18.12 16.67 14.54 2.6380*
1962 17.02 17.80 16.43 14.42 2.3609*
1963 16.94 17.58 16.76 13.90 1.9551
1964 16.88 17.68 16.59 13.23 2.4940*
1965 17.16 18.26 16.72 12.32 3.7811**
1966 17.91 19.09 17.65 12.02 5.3705**
1967 19.75 20.78 19.89 13.38 4.8172*
1968 21.50 22.50 21.64 15.40 3.0557*
1969 24.87 25.70 24.98 19.80 1.5019
1970 30.50 31.91 28.95 27.44 .8227
1971 33.74 35.99 29.95 32.97 1.6098
1972 33.27 34.42 31.44 32.53 .7418
1973 36.11 37.36 34.01 35.71 .6184
1974 42.86 43.53 39.45 49.82 1.7330
1975 38.12 39.02 34.80 43.55 1.9969
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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FOOTNOTES
Rates of return are generally determined by the cost of capital.
See Petersen (1976) for details. The regulatory process specifies rele-
vant costs and expenses which may be recovered by the utility firm as
services are priced to the buyer. The revenue requirement, that is the
revenue that the utility is authorized to collect, may be defined as
follows. See Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p. 44) for the following
treatment:
(1) Revenue requirement = cost of service(2)RR=E+d+T+ (V-W)R
where: RR = revenue requirement
E = operating expense
d = depreciation expense
T = taxes
V = gross valuation of the property serving the public
W = accrued depreciation
R = rate of return (a percentage)
(V-W) = rate base (net valuation)
(V-W)R = return amount, or earnings allowed on the rate base
2
Hagerman and P^atchford (1978) have found the different allowed
rates of return are used to compensate the different rate base. How-
ever, they could not determine whether this adjustment is optimal.
3Under unrealistic extreme assumptions, Killer and Modigliani
(1961) have argued that dividend policy will generally not affect the
value of a firm. However, most recently Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1980) used the tax effects, clientele effect and investors' preference
arguments to show that investors might prefer dividends instead of
capital gains.
4
In analyzing leverage, diversification and capital market effects
on risk-adjusted capital budgeting, Tuttle and Litzenberger (1968, pp.
428-29) have argued that the firm does have the option of neutralizing
the risk inherent in a given investment opportunity through long-term
borrovring or lending. In "The Tedinology of P.isk and Return" Greenberg,
et. al., (1978) also discussed the joint determination of financial risk
and business risk in capital asset pricing process.
9 =In Tables 1-b, 2 and 3, group 1 = original cost regime; group
fair value regime; and group 3 = reproduction cost regime.
Adar, Barnea, and Lev's (1977) comprehensive CV? analysis has
analyzed the economic implications of C\T and break-even analyses.
Kite (1977) has shown that cost of capital need not decline with
leverage even in perfect capital markets and v'ith default-free debt. This
finding may be used to justify why different regulation regimes affect the
capital structure in some years and not in other years.
-29-
g
They use this definition to show that the higher the marginal cor-
porate tax rate and degree of leverage, the smaller the variance in after
tax revenue.
9
See Scanlon (1972) for detail.
A more liberal regulation will generally increase a firm's total
returns. See Primeaux (1978).
The classification list is available from the authors. Primeaux
(1978) discusses the difficulty of classifying states according to rate
base methods; therefore, the procedure used by Primeaux was developed to
avoid these difficulties. The same procedure was used in this study to
assure accuracy.
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APPENDIX A
Firms Included in the Sample
(According to Rate Base Method)
Original Cost
Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Central Main Power Co.
Concord Electric Co.
Consolidated Edison Co.
Green Mountain Power Corp.
Long Island Lighting Co.
Maine Public Service
New York State Electric & Gas
Niagra Mohawk Power Corp.
Orange & Rockland Utilities
Pacific Gas & Electric
Public Service Co. of Colorado
Rochester Gas & Electric
San Diego Gas & Electric
Southern California Edison
United Illuminating Co.
Boston Edison Co.
Central Louisiana Electric Co.
Consumer's Power Co.
Detroit Edison Co.
Edison Sault Electric Co.
Fitchburg Gas & Electric
Florida Power & Light
Florida Power Corp.
Hawaiian Electric Co.
Kansas Gas & Electric
Kansas Power & Light
Madison Gas & Electric
Savannah Electric & Power Co.
Tampa Electric
Upper Penninsula Power Co.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
Wisconsin Power & Light
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APPEKDIX A (cont.)
Fair Value
Arizona Public Service Co. Indianapolis Power & Light Co.
Duquesne Light Co. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. Missouri Utilities Co.
Public Service Electric & Gas Co. Philadelphia Electric Co.
Tucson Gas & Electric Co. Public Service Co. of Indiana
Atlantic City Electric Co. Public Service Co. of New Mexico
Central Illinois Light Co. St. Joseph Light & Power
Central Illinois Public Service Co. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co,
Commonwealth Edison Co. UGI Corporation
Illinois Power
Reproduction Cost
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. Dayton Power & Light
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. Ohio Edison
Columbus Southern Ohio Electric Co. Toledo Edison
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APPENDIX B
Data Summary
1. Total operating revenue for firm i = PQi; data obtained Moody's Public
Utility Manual [MPUM].
2. Total variable cost for firm i = VQi; data obtained from MPUM.
3. Total operating fixed cost for firm i = FCi; data obtained from MJ'Ul'I.
4. Total returns for firm i = Xi ; this variable was defined to be net
operating revenues plus taxes. Data from MPUM.
5. Total interest charges for firm i = li. It was defined to be interest
on long-term debt plus other interest charges. Data from MPUM.
6. Total long-term debt (or total debt) of firm i = Di. The book value
of long-term debt (or total debt) for firm i. Data obtained from MPUM.
7. Total book value of assets for firm i = Ai.
8. Rate base methods were validated by referring to 5 different sources
to assure that the correct rate base method was used in this study.
This information vjas obtained from Eiteman (1962), Pike (1967),
Phillips (1969), and Senate Document No. 56, 90th Congress 1st Session
State Utility Commissions Summary and Tabulation of Information
Submitted by the Commissions , and State of Arizona, Arizona Corporation
Commission Annual Report (1970).
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